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Prior research examines the relation between the amount of annual option exercises and 
discretionary accruals, which are a conventional tool for earnings management. I differentiate 
from prior studies by exclusively focusing on the vested portion of equity-based 
compensation¾specifically, exercisable stock options and vested restricted stocks. Bebchuck 
and Fried (2010) provide multiple anecdotal evidences such that managers holding vested 
equity compensation are tempted to influence stock prices in various manners because they 
can immediately unwind the equity incentive portion into cash. Another key difference of this 
paper form the prior literature is that I apply the concept of earnings response coefficients 
(ERCs hereafter) to the perverse relation between long-term equity incentive and short-term 
earnings management. I find that when the ERC is interacted with the equity incentive, I find 
the size of earnings management (in terms of performance-matched discretionary accruals) 
becomes significantly larger. I interpret that managers of firms with the higher ERC can 
enjoy more benefits from creating positive abnormal accruals because share prices respond to 
the greater extent on the earnings information. Next, the empirical analysis shows that 
earnings persistence impairs as the size of unloadable equity holdings grows and this negative 
association prevails particularly when the ERC is higher. The results collectively provide a 
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new insight to the earnings management literature from the perspective of earnings-return 
sensitivity.  
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 Although stock-based compensation has been widely used in the standard executives’ 
pay arrangements since the 1980s and especially popular in the 1990s, for its role of 
improved firm performance, the use of stock-based compensation has come under scrutiny. 
Despite its intention of paying for long-term performance, the stock-based compensation in 
executive pay structure has raised concerns for rewarding executives actually for short-term 
results (Bebchuck and Fried 2010; Bhagat and Romano 2010). Stock-based compensation 
might encourage managers to excessively focus on short-term results. For example, managers 
rewarded with equity compensation might increase short-term stock prices in order to benefit 
from subsequently selling shares of their own firm. To maximize their private wealth, they 
are likely to engage in income-increasing earnings management to boost the short-term stock 
price although that may in fact deteriorate the firm value. This study extends prior studies that 
have examined the association between equity incentives and earnings management, by 
considering earnings response coefficient as a critical catalyst of earnings manipulation. 
Prior research examines the relation between the amount of annual option exercises 
and discretionary accruals, which are a conventional tool for earnings management (Bartov 
and Mohanram 2004). Bergstresser and Philippon (2006) find evidence of a positive relation 
between option compensation and the use of discretionary accruals. Cheng and Warfield 
(2005) use meeting or just beating analysts’ forecasts, as a proxy for the market consequences 
of earnings management, to show its relation with equity incentives. In addition, Burns and 
Kedia (2006) find that top managers with stock options that are more sensitive to stock price 
are likely to engage in a misreporting which results in a restatement. The recent research by 
6 
 
Armstrong et al. (2013) document managers’ opportunistic behaviors of temporarily boosting 
the stock price before unwinding their equity incentive, by considering portfolio delta (the 
sensitivity of the manager’s wealth to changes in stock price) and portfolio vega (the 
sensitivity of the manager’s wealth to changes in risk). In short, prior studies have illuminated 
the link between earnings management and managerial incentives stemming from stock-
based compensation. 
My research corroborates this stream of research; however, I differentiate from prior 
studies by exclusively focusing on the vested portion of equity-based compensation¾ 
specifically, exercisable stock options and vested restricted stocks. Stock options and 
restricted stocks are typical forms of equity-linked compensation, and compose a significant 
portion in executive pay structure, almost 50 percent of total compensation in year 2008 
(Frydman and Jenter 2010). For both types of equity-linked compensation, the original 
objective is to incentivize managers to maximize long-term shareholders value. However, 
such equity incentives can bring undesirable consequences in certain situations. For example, 
Bebchuck and Fried (2010) discuss that managers holding vested equity compensation are 
tempted to influence stock prices in various manners because they can immediately unwind 
the equity incentive portion into cash. In particular, when the manager accumulates a large 
amount of vested equity incentives through past periods, they are likely to undergo strong 
short-term incentives to boost the stock price by manipulating accounting earnings so as to 
increase the benefits from selling shares in the near future. Thus, the incentive to increase the 
stock price through income-increasing earnings management should be more tightly reflected 
with the exercisable options and vested shares than total equity compensation1. My empirical 
                                         
1 I note that the vested portion of equity-based compensation is not determined upon annual grants but 
represents the accumulated amount upon all of the past rewards because the latter implies the maximum size 




analysis shows that the size of earnings management2 is greater for firms whose CEOs have 
larger amounts of vested equity-based compensation. 
 Another key difference of this study from the literature is that I apply earnings 
response coefficients (ERC hereafter) to the perverse relation between long-term equity 
incentive and short-term earnings management. Earnings management gets effective only if it 
can influence stock prices (Cheng and Warfield 2005). I expect that those managers who 
intend to sell shares in the subsequent periods are more strongly tempted to manipulate 
earnings upward, particularly when the capital market actively incorporate earnings 
information in forming the belief about the firm’s future performance. To capture such 
environment, I turn to the concept of ERCs (Ball and Brown 1968). Provided with the 
variation in the magnitude of firm-level ERCs, I predict that managers of firms with the 
higher ERC have greater incentive to create positive abnormal accruals because such firms 
have stronger earnings-returns sensitivity than those with lower ERCs. 
 To test whether ERCs involve earnings management following the manager’s 
unloadable equity, I construct the interaction term of the measure for equity incentives and 
the ERC and examine its relation with earnings management. Our empirical results show that 
there is no significant relation between earnings management and standalone ERCs. However, 
when the ERC is interacted with the managerial incentive (the vested portion of equity-linked 
compensation), I find the size of earnings management (in terms of performance-matched 
discretionary accruals) becomes significantly larger.3 I extend the analysis on top five highly 
paid executives as my additional test and find consistent empirical findings as the analysis on 
CEOs.  
                                         
2 I empirically measure the earnings management by performance-matched discretionary accruals suggested by 
Kothari et al. (2005). The details on the measure are presented in section 3. 
3 I measure the ERC in four different ways based on the literature and the results are the same. The details of 
ERC measurement are explained in section 3. 
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 I also explore the implication of the equity-driven earnings management incentive on 
the earnings persistence. The literature has extensively documented impaired earnings quality 
stemming from improper accrual management. If earnings manipulation is to some extent a 
reflection of the perverse incentive by vested equity compensation, I can predict that earnings 
quality would get lower with such incentive. I examine whether earnings persistency varies 
according to the size of vested equity compensation for managers. When I divide the 
observations into three groups based on the magnitude of ERC, the results clearly indicate 
that earnings persistence is negatively associated with the size of unloadable equity 
compensation and this association prevails when the ERC is higher. This analysis provides 
additional evidence of the interaction of ERCs and managers’ short-term earnings 
management incentive. 
Bebchuck and Fried (2010) provide anecdotal evidence of how firms have struggled 
from the manager’s opportunistic behaviors to engage in earnings manipulation upon the 
equity incentive schemes, and suggest several proposals to remedy the problem. The 
importance of long-term incentives is not merely the issue for academia recent government, 
the Obama administration in 2009, calls for reformation of executive compensation practices 
to more closely align compensation with long-term value creation. This perverse situation 
sprouting from careless equity incentive is an ongoing problem, and thus, I view the 
exercisable options and vested restricted stocks as the variables linked more directly to 
managers’ dysfunctional incentive compared to prior research. Overall, my results provide a 
new insight to the earnings management literature from the perspective of earnings-return 
sensitivity. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, I review prior 
literature and develop the hypotheses. In section 3, I describe the sample data, empirical 
models, and variable measurement used in the analyses. Section 4 presents empirical results, 
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and section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Hypotheses Development 
 Equity-based compensations are typically used to reduce the agency problem by 
aligning executives’ and shareholders’ interests. By tying executive compensation to stock 
price outcomes, managers are encouraged to make operating and investing decisions that 
maximize shareholder wealth (Jensen and Meckling 1976). Theoretically, as managers hold 
more shares and increase ownership, they are more likely to make decisions in the interests of 
shareholders and increase the future firm performance (McConnell and Servaes 1990; Core 
and Guay 1999). However, there have been concerns in both practice and academia because 
equity compensations often entice executives to focus on short-term performance sacrificing 
the firm’s long-term value. Under typical arrangements for equity-linked compensation, 
managers obtain freedom to cash out their equity holdings after vesting. This ability can 
mislead managers to disclose favorable information more aggressively so that they can 
benefit more from the increase of short-term stock prices¾the prices at which they can 
unload their vested shares and options. Such dysfunctional incentive is likely to aggravate 
when executives hold large amounts of cashable equity. 
One way managers can influence the stock price of the firm is to manipulate reported 
performance by actively intervening in the financial reporting process (Subramanyam 1996). 
Prior studies have extensively documented the evidences supporting the association between 
equity incentives and earnings management. Bartov and Mohanram (2004) find that firms 
with large amount of annual option exercises are more likely to have higher discretionary 
accruals (as a result, higher reported earnings) in those years and, lower discretionary 
accruals and earnings in succeeding periods reflecting the reversal of inflated earnings. 
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Cheng and Warfield (2005) investigate how the firm’s meeting or just beating analysts’ 
forecasts relates to its manager’s equity incentive. In addition, Burns and Kedia (2006) find 
that top managers with stock options that are more sensitive to stock price are likely to 
engage in a misreporting which results in a restatement. The recent research by Armstrong et 
al. (2013) extends this research stream on equity incentives and misreporting, by considering 
the incentive effects of portfolio delta (the sensitivity of the manager’s wealth to changes in 
stock price) and portfolio vega (the sensitivity of the manager’s wealth to changes in risk) for 
risk averse managers. 
 In contrast to the literature, I focus exclusively on the forms of stock-based holdings 
that are defined as “exercisable” or “vested” according to a vesting schedule of the particular 
executive―namely, exercisable stock options and vested restricted stocks. Under a standard 
stock option plan, a specified number of options becomes exercisable (i.e., vested) each year 
and remains exercisable forwards. Once they are vested, the manager can either hold the 
exercisable options or immediately exercise the options and sell their shares so as to unwind 
the equity incentive and convert them into cash. Restricted stock grants function in a very 
similar manner as stock options. When restricted stocks are received, the ownership of the 
stocks vests gradually. The problem with such equity incentive plans arises as the vesting 
period ends. If a manager has accumulated a large amount of vested equity incentive, he may 
have myopic incentive to manipulate earnings information to boost the stock price helping 
maximize the manager’s private benefits from unloading the equity. Bebchuck and Fried 
(2010) provide anecdotal evidence of how firms have struggled from the manager’s 
opportunistic behaviors to engage in earnings manipulation upon the equity incentive 
schemes, and suggest several proposals to remedy the problem. This perverse situation 
sprouting from careless equity incentive is an ongoing problem, and thus, I use the 
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exercisable options and vested restricted stocks that are more tightly linked to the manager’s 
incentive to generate positive information for capital market aiming at stock price 
appreciation. 
Considering the manager’s short-term incentives to manage earnings and increase 
stock price, I examine the earnings-returns sensitivity by applying the earnings response 
coefficients (ERCs) on the relation between vested equity holding and earnings management. 
The ERC indicates the earnings-return relation; specifically, higher earnings changes are 
associated with higher stock returns for individual firms (Ball and Brown 1968). This can be 
measured as the slope coefficient of the returns-earnings regression (Collins and Kothari 
1989; Collins et al. 1999; DeFond and Park 2001; Francis et al. 2002) and Chen et al. (2012) 
show that there is a considerable variation in the magnitude of firm-level ERC. 
The primary goal of my research is to examine whether equity incentives driven by 
exercisable options and vested stocks lead executives to earnings management. For the 
managers who can sell their vested shares, maintaining the short-term stock price at a higher 
level for the time period around unwinding equity incentive is critical because, they are free 
to sell their stock holdings once exercisable or vested. Under this circumstance, it is 
important to assure whether using discretionary accruals to increase earnings would be 
effectively influence the security market favorably. In that regard, prior literature has 
examined if accounting accruals significantly influence the valuation of securities. 
Subramanyam (1996) finds that the market does price abnormal accruals, which are estimated 
using Jones (1991) model. Sloan (1996) and Collins and Hribar (2000a) find that the market 
overprices total accruals but, fails to fully incorporate the lower persistence of the accrual 
component of earnings. Teoh et al. (1998a, 1998b) and Rangan (1998) provide evidences for 
the overpricing abnormal accruals used to increase earnings before initial public offerings 
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(IPOs) or seasoned equity offerings. Xie (2001) shows that the market does not rationally 
impound publicly disclosed accounting information by overestimating abnormal accruals in 
more general setting. The overpricing of abnormal accruals in the financial market provides 
managers opportunistic incentives to manipulate earnings and the stock price. 
Following the prior research on the role of accruals in pricing securities, DeFond and 
Park (2001) investigates the market’s perception of the magnitude of earnings surprises that 
contain abnormal accruals and finds that it affects the slope coefficient of the returns-earnings 
regressions or ERC. The ERC shows an estimate of the change in a firm’s stock price due to 
the information provided in a firm’s earnings announcement. Since the ERCs exhibit cross-
sectional variation (Collins and Kothari 1989) and its variation becomes apparent in recent 
periods after 2000 (Chen et al. 2012), how the market perceives about the accounting 
information containing abnormal accruals varies with a firm’s magnitude of ERC. I expect 
that the propensity to use of discretionary accruals to manage earnings is greater for managers 
in the firms with higher ERCs, because the reported earnings are highly associated with the 
stock prices. As in the hypotheses, I further expect that for managers holding substantial 
amount of vested stocks and options thus, have greater incentives to manipulate earnings and 
increase the short-term stock price, their earnings management incentives appear to be 
stronger for those in the firms with higher ERCs. That is, magnitudes of ERCs expect to 
operate as a mediating variable in the relation between equity incentives and earnings 
management. 
Applying the concept of ERC in the capital market valuation mechanism, I presume 
that the effect of using abnormal accruals to manage reported earnings on the stock price is 
stronger for firms with higher ERCs because such firms have stronger earnings-returns 
sensitivity compared to those with lower ERCs. In other words, in circumstances where the 
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stock price does not respond much to earnings information, managers are expected not to use 
earnings management to make a positive influence on the capital market even though they 
hold a large amount of vested restricted shares and exercisable stock options. Therefore, 
linking the firm-level ERC with earnings management incentives, I conjecture that a firm’s 
ERC level plays a facilitating role in earnings management in association with the short-term 
equity incentive. 
 
H1: The magnitude of income-increasing earnings management stemming from 
vested equity holding is positively associated with the earnings-returns 
sensitivity. 
 
In addition, I explore the implication of the equity-driven earnings management 
incentive on the earnings persistence. The literature has extensively documented impaired 
earnings quality stemming from improper accrual management. If earnings manipulation is to 
some extent a reflection of the perverse incentive by vested equity compensation, I can 
predict that earnings quality would get lower with such incentive. I examine whether earnings 
persistency varies according to the size of vested equity compensation for managers. 
I further expect that the size of impairment in earnings persistence is a function of the 
ERC. The rationale is that earnings manipulation for short-term price increase should prevail 
when the stock market is very sensitive to earnings changes based on the previous hypothesis. 
Thus, in my second hypothesis, I predict that earnings persistence is negatively associated 
with the size of unloadable equity compensation particularly when the ERC is higher. 
 
H2: Earnings persistence is lower in the periods when the managers hold a larger 
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amount of vested equity, and this negative association gets stronger in the 
firms with higher ERCs. 
 
3. Sample Selection and Variable Measurement 
3.1 Sample 
 I am interested in examining whether managers rewarded with stock-based 
compensation exercise income-increasing earnings manipulation to inflate the stock prices. 
At the fiscal-year end managers may have various forms of equity-based holdings, but I 
exclusively focus on exercisable options and vested stocks for their earnings management 
incentives. I obtain the stock-based compensation data from the Standard & Poor’s 
ExecuComp database for the years 1993-20124. I exclude the firm-years missing both the 
data of exercisable options and vested stocks, which result in the sample size to 35,195 firm-
year observations with 3,401 firms.  
 Next, I retrieve all other financial data from Compustat to develop the major proxy 
for the income-increasing earnings management, performance-matched discretionary accruals 
strictly followed by Kothari et al. (2005), and control variables. I collect data from Compustat 
for estimating discretionary abnormal accruals.  
I also need to estimate the earnings response coefficient (ERC). The data necessary 
for ERCs is obtained from Compustat database for the period 1984-2012. I estimate the ERC 
for each firm for the years 1993-2012 on a rolling basis of 10 years. I employ three prior 
studies to improve the validity of the ERC measurement that are based on Francis et al. 
                                         
4 The Standard & Poor’s ExecuComp database starts from year 1992. I exclude the year 1992 followed by prior 




(2002), Ali and Zarowin (1992) and Collins and Kothari (1989), respectively.5 Based on the 
ERC estimation method presented in Francis et al. (2002), I calculate ERC1 and ERC2 which 
results in 24,638 firm-year observations. ERC3, estimated based on Ali and Zarowin (1992), 
includes 28,776 firm-year observations. In addition, ERC4 is calculated based on the 
methodology presented in Collins and Kothari (1989)’s paper and results in 6,749 
observations.  
Finally, I merge the sample for CEO stock-based compensation, discretionary 
accruals, the estimated ERCs and control variables to test my hypotheses. The merging 
procedure results in an incremental loss of observations because of non-matching and missing 
data, specifically due to a rolling regression of 10 years to estimate the ERC and due to lack 
of observations in CEO vested portion of stock-based compensation. The final sample can be 
classified into three based on the three different methods to obtain ERCs. The first sample 
with ERC1 and ERC2 results in 14,998 firm-year observations, the second sample with ERC3 
results in 11,301 firm-year observations and the third sample with ERC4 results in 3,284 
firm-year observations.  
 
3.2 Variable Measurement 
3.2.1. Equity incentive 
 A large number of prior studies examining the effect of equity incentives on earnings 
management have used the value of executives’ stock option portfolios or restricted stock 
holdings or stock ownership or combination of these elements to generate variables for 
equity-based incentives. Core and Guay (2002) use the dollar change in the value of stock or 
option holdings that would come from a one percentage point increase in the company stock 
                                         
5 Details of the ERC estimation methods are presented in section 3.2.3. 
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price that is termed as portfolio delta. “Incentive ratio” (portfolio delta scaled by total 
compensation) is proposed by Bergstresser and Philippon (2006), thereafter many researchers 
have adopted this measure (e.g., Jiang et al. 2010; Kim et al. 2011). Similarly, Cornett et al. 
(2008) use the grants of new stock options and Cheng and Warfield (2005) use the amount of 
stock ownership as their primary measure for equity incentives. 
 In my analysis pertinent to the short-term price increasing incentive, I exclusively 
focus on the vested portion of equity-linked compensation―the value of exercisable stock 
options and vested restricted stocks―because, managers holding these forms of equity are 
allowed to immediately cash them out. The literature in agency theory suggests self-
interested managers take full advantage of equity dispositions and tend to engage in accrual 
earnings managements. I define VESTED_EQ as the value of exercisable options and vested 
restricted stocks which have been awarded through the past periods.6 I scale VESTED_EQ by 
total compensation (TDC1 in the Execucomp database) which is composed of salary, bonus, 
stock option grants, restricted stock grants, long-term incentive plan payouts, and other 
annual compensation. For the easier interpretation of the results, I use normalized value of 
VESTED_EQ. 
 
3.2.2. Measure of earnings management 
I use discretionary accruals, which is a conventional measure for earnings 
management. I adopt the performance-matched modified Jones model following the 
procedure proposed in Kothari et al. (2005) to calculate discretionary accruals. I match each 
firm-year observations with another firm from the same Fama and French 48 industry 
                                         
6 If CEO exercisable options is missing then, I only use vested restricted stocks and vice versa due to lack 
observations in the value of exercisable options and vested restricted shares. I exclude the firm years missing 
both.    
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classifications with the closest return on assets each year. I then calculate performance-
matched discretionary accruals, DA, by taking the difference between the unadjusted DA and 
the return on the asset-matched firm’s DA.  
I adopt the signed discretionary accruals (DA) as my proxy for the outcome of 
opportunistic income-increasing earnings management. The sign of discretionary accruals 
either positive or negative indicates whether the discretionary accruals are used as income-
increasing or income-decreasing accruals, respectively. In this study, income-increasing 
accruals play an important role for executives holding vested stocks and options because 
managers, before selling their shares, have incentive to increase the reported earnings and 
hence the short-term stock price. Therefore, I use the signed discretionary accruals as the 
measure of earnings management. 
 
3.2.3. Earnings Response Coefficients (ERC) 
 To determine the firm-level ERC, I employ three different approaches. First, I take 
the earnings-return sensitivity from Francis et al. (2002)’s models as follows: 
     = a ,  + a ,  	    + x             (1) 
        = a ,  + a ,  	    + x       (2) 
where     	is the abnormal return for firm i and year t,         is      divided by the 
standard deviation of firm i’s signed abnormal returns on all trading days in year t, and      
is price-scaled unexpected earnings conveyed by firm i’s earnings report in year t. While 
Francis et al. (2002) measure the unexpected earnings      in two different ways (annual 
random-walk difference and the difference between earnings and the most recent analyst 
forecast), I take the former method. I estimate the ERC coefficient for each firm, a ,  	, on a 
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rolling basis of 10 years.7 I denote a ,  	 estimates in equation (1) by ERC1 and those in 
equation (2) by ERC2. 
Next, I measure ERCs by considering both permanent and transitory components of 
earnings information. As suggested by Ali and Zarowin’s (1992) moving average process of 
annual earnings, I add the level variable of earnings (earnings per share scaled by the 
beginning-of-year share price) to the change variable (    ) in equation (1) as follows: 
      = d , + d , 	(   −      )/     + d ,    /     +      (3) 
where    , 	is the abnormal return,   ,  is earnings per share,		  , −   ,    is changes in 
earnings per share,   ,    is the stock price in the beginning of year used as a scale variable 
for firm   in year  . Theoretically, Easton and Harris (1991) first suggest that both earnings 
changes and level have explanatory power when they are included simultaneously in a 
regression of annual returns on earnings. The earnings levels work as an additional measure 
for unexpected earnings when the previous year’s earnings are not purely permanent, and 
thereby contribute to the explanatory power of earnings-returns model. Considering both 
permanent and transitory components contained in earnings, the sum of the coefficients on all 
proxies for earnings, that is the sum of d , 	and d , , defines as ERC3. 
 In my final ERC specification, I consider the reverse causality between earnings and 
stock returns as well. To obtain the earnings-return sensitivity based on the reverse causality, 
I adopt Collins and Kothari’s (1989) model as follows: 
%D   							= g , + g , 	   + g , 	    ∗    + g , 	      ∗    + e    (4) 
where %D    are the change in EPS from year t-1 to t divided, respectively by share price at 
the beginning of the period and by the EPS for the prior year,     is annual return,      is 
market to book value of equity ratio calculated at the beginning of year t, and        is 
                                         
7 By taking the rolling estimation approach, I allow each firm’s ERC can vary over time. 
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market model systematic risk. I denote g
 , 	
 in equation (4) as ERC4. 
 To estimate ERCs for firm  , I use rolling regressions. In each earnings-returns 
model, I estimate the ERC coefficients multiple times for each firm i with ten-year window. 
For example, the data from year 1984 to 1993 is used in equation (1) to estimate ERC1 for 
firm   in year 1993 (a , 	    	), the data from 1985 to 1994 for (a , 	    	), and so on.  
 
3.2.4. Control variables 
 In addition to the test variables, VESTED_EQ, DA and ERC1-4, I include various 
control variables that are known to affect CEO earnings management incentives. (e.g., 
Armstrong et al. 2010; Armstrong et al. 2013). Following prior research, I control for firm 
size (SIZE), growth opportunities (MB), leverage (LEV), past accounting performance (ROA), 
sales growth (SALES_GROWTH), firm age (FIRMAGE), capital intensity (CAPEX), fixed 
assets or tangible assets (TANGIBILITY), R&D expense (R&D) and its dummy (D_R&D). 
SALES _GROWTH addresses the possibility that poorly performing firms commit earnings 
manipulation in order to increase the growth in sales or the opposite possibility that highly 
growing firms use discretionary accruals to sustain their position. I include numerous controls 
to reflect various aspects of firm characteristics. 
 I control for both year and industry by including year dummies for the sample period 
1993-2012 and industry dummies based on Fama and French 48 industry classifications.8  
 
4. Empirical Design and Results 
4.1. Descriptive statistics 
                                         
8 I use the same Fama and French 48 industry classifications as in discretionary accruals estimation.  
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 Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the key variables and controls. Panel A 
relates to the sample for the first two measures for ERC (ERC1 and ERC2) which are 
estimated through the methods presented in Francis et al. (2002). Panel B presents the sample 
for ERC3 from Ali and Zarowin (1992) and Panel C for ERC4 from Collins and Kothari 
(1989). The mean value of VESTED_EQ in Panel A, Table 1 is 1.56, which means the vested 
equity compensation accumulated through the past periods is on average 56% larger than the 
executive managers’ current total compensation. Its median value of 0.543 indicates that the 
accumulatively vested shares amount to more than 50% of the current total pay. These 
numbers for VESTED_EQ are similar in Panel B and Panel C, and suggest the managers 
usually hold a significant amount of equity that is subject to immediate unwinding.  
The mean of discretionary accruals (DA) is -0.048 in Panel A, which is close to zero, 
manifesting similar statistics to those reported in previous studies. Panel B and C reports the 
mean of discretionary accruals as -0.018 and -0.072, respectively. The ERCs estimated at the 
firm level have different mean and median values across the four different specifications due 
to different estimation methodologies. Also, ERC values vary substantially widely among 
sample firms for all of the four estimation methods. This ensures the main analyses that 
examine the impact of the firm-level ERC magnitude on the earnings management. 
 
[Insert Table 1] 
 
Table 2 presents Pearson correlation coefficients across the main and control 
variables. The four ERC measures, ERC1 through ERC4, show in general positive correlation 
with one another at 5% significance levels, but they do not have any significant correlation 




[Insert Table 2] 
 
4.2. Empirical Results 
4.2.1. The effect of ERC on the association between the manager’s vested equity holding 
and earnings management (H1)  
The first hypothesis anticipates that a firm’s ERC plays a facilitating role in earnings 
management in association with the short-term equity incentive. To test H2, my main test 
variable is       _    ×       and regress the interaction term on the earnings 
management measure, DA: 
    =   +          +        _    ×        +         _    +         
+	        +		      +	       +		       	+ 	       _         
+	          	 +	          +	 	                + 	    & 		 
+	    _ &   +                                              (5) 
where       is firm-level earnings response coefficient in year t. In this empirical 
specification, the primary focus is on   , the coefficient estimate on the interaction term 
      _  	 , ×     , . The interaction term is meaningful because the manager’s income-
increasing earnings management would be more instrumental in boosting share prices 
provided with a higher ERC. Following the prediction in H1, I expect the coefficient    to 
be positive. 
Table 3 presents the results of equations (5). Column (1), (3), (5) and (7) represent 
the empirical results without both year and fixed effects and column (2), (4), (6) and (8) are 
with both fixed effects. Consistent with my prediction, the interaction term       _    ×
      obtains significantly positive coefficient estimates across the three ERC measures out 
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of four different ERC measures. For instance in column (2), ERC1 produces    of 0.0102 
with discretionary accruals as the dependent variable with both year and industry fixed effects. 
The coefficient on standalone       _   ,  loses its statistical significance implying that 
ERC operates as a catalyst to the CEO’s income-increasing earnings management incentives. 
This shows that as a firm’s estimated ERC increases, a manager who holds vested options and 
stocks (       _   , )  has stronger incentive to engage in earnings management 
manipulating accruals. Consistent with H1, ERC2 and ERC3 (only on the test without both 
fixed effects) present similar patterns as the empirical results on ERC1, showing positive and 
significant coefficient on the interaction term	      _    ×      . In column (6), the test 
on ERC3 with both fixed effects, however shows positive but insignificant coefficient on the 
interaction term. The analyses with ERC4 also present positive coefficient on the interaction 
term but with low statistical significance.  
Interestingly, the coefficient for       (  ) is mostly not significantly associated 
with discretionary accruals. This result suggests that ERC itself does not have any influence 
on the manager’s earnings management incentive but it plays a role of catalyst when 
interacted with the equity compensation available for unloading. That is, the managers’ 
dysfunctional behavior seeking for a short-term price appraisal must be understood with the 
earnings-returns sensitivity. Although the literature documents small ERCs in empirical tests, 
my findings suggest that the valuation coefficient of earnings is important for certain contexts 
such as the managers’ unwinding equity incentive. 
 
[Insert Table 3] 
 
4.2.2. Earnings persistence (H2) 
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To examine the second hypothesis, I use the simple earnings time-series model by 
interacting the previous period’s earnings with the vested equity holding as in equation (10) 
below, and test if the coefficient of the interaction term, y
 	
, has a negative value using a 
pooled sample. 
     	= y + y 	       + y 	       ∗       _      + y 	      _       
  +y
 	
       + y 	       ∗        + e               (6)
9 
Because I expect that       _   undermines earnings quality only when the ERC is 
sufficiently large as in the previous analyses, I trisect the entire sample observations with 
respect to the ERC value. I expect a significantly negative y
 	
 for the highest ERC 
subsample but a non-significant estimate of y
 	
	for the lowest ERC subsample. 
 Table 4 reports the results from the pooling regression on equation (6). When I 
determine ERCs based on Francis et al.’s (2002) approach, i.e., ERC1 and ERC2, there is a 
monotonic decrease in y
 	
 as the subsample group shifts from low ERCs to the high. I 
divide the sample based on the magnitude of ERC into three subsamples (T1, T2 and T3). The 
empirical findings show that the subsample with high ERCs (T3) clearly shows an 
impairment in earnings persistence given the CEO’s vested portion of equity based 
compensation. When I replicate the tests by dividing the sample into two, I find consistent 
results. When I estimate ERCs based on Ali and Zarowin’s (1992) approach, i.e., ERC3, there 
is no salient monotonic decreasing persistence of earnings as the subsample group moves 
from low ERCs to the high. I only find a decline in earnings persistence in the subsample in 
the middle in term of ERC magnitude (T2), but with low statistical significance.10  
                                         
9 The loss indicator NEG and its interaction with EPS are included as in the earnings persistence literature. For 
instance, see Atwood et al. (2010). 
10 I perform the test of earnings persistency with ERC4, which determined based on Collins and Kothari’s (1989) 
approach. In Table 3, I find that the analysis on the CEO’s earnings management incentives tested with ERC4 




[Insert Table 4] 
 
4.2.3. Additional test on the effect of ERC on the association between the top five 
executives’ vested equity holding and earnings management  
 I extend my prediction on the implication of a firm’s ERC in earnings management in 
relation with top five executives’ short-term equity incentives. I select top five executives 
who are typically the firm’s five highest-paid officers followed by prior research. (e.g., Hall 
and Murphy 2003). Top executives are also rewarded with substantial amount of stock-based 
compensation, and thus I conjecture that they have similar dysfunctional incentives to 
manage earnings and increase stock prices for their benefits. Therefore, I repeat the analysis 
in Table 3 using Eq. (5) after determining top five highly paid executives and test whether 
ERC still plays a facilitating role in earnings management in association with the short-term 
equity incentive. 
 The results are presented in Table 5 and remains qualitatively identical to those 
currently analyzed only with CEOs. Across all four measures of ERC, coefficient on the 
interaction term       _    ×       is positive but, only two measures of ERC out of 
four show statistical significance at 10% level.11 The results incrementally support the 
previous finding that the executives’ income-increasing earnings management would be more 
instrumental in increasing share prices provided with a higher ERC.  
 
 [Insert Table 5] 
                                                                                                                               
Thus, I exclude the results from the main table.   
11 The weak statistical significance in the test with top five executives might be attributed to different incentives 





Prior research examines the relation between the amount of annual option exercises 
and discretionary accruals, which are a conventional tool for earnings management. 
Bebchuck and Fried (2010) provide anecdotal evidence of how firms have struggled from the 
manager’s opportunistic behaviors to engage in earnings manipulation upon the equity 
incentive schemes, and suggest several proposals to remedy the problem. This perverse 
situation sprouting from careless equity incentive is an ongoing problem, and thus, I 
investigate whether or not the exercisable options and vested restricted stocks are linked to 
the manager’s incentive to generate positive information for capital market aiming at stock 
price appreciation. 
I perform two analyses to examine the relation between unloadable equity 
(exercisable stock options and vested restricted stocks) and earnings management. First, I 
find that when the ERC is interacted with the equity incentive, I find the size of earnings 
management (in terms of discretionary accruals) becomes significantly larger. I interpret that 
CEOs of firms with the higher ERC can enjoy more benefits from creating positive abnormal 
accruals because share prices respond to the greater extent on the earnings information. I 
additionally repeat my analysis using top five highly paid executives and, find slightly weak 
but supporting evidence on executives’ earnings management incentives given higher ERCs. 
Next, my empirical analysis shows that earnings persistence impairs as the size of unloadable 
equity holdings grows and this negative association prevails particularly when the ERC is 
higher. 
In contrast to the literature, I focus exclusively on the forms of stock-based holdings 
that are defined as “exercisable” or “vested” according to a vesting schedule of the particular 
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executive―namely, exercisable stock options and vested restricted stocks. Managers holding 
large amounts of unloadable equity from their incentive compensation schemes are tempted 
to influence stock prices in various manners because they can immediately unwind the equity 
incentive into cash. Thus, I view the exercisable options and vested restricted stocks as the 
variables linked more directly to managers’ dysfunctional incentive compared to prior 
research. Another key difference of this study from the previous literature is that I apply 
earnings response coefficients (ERCs hereafter) to the perverse relation between long-term 
equity incentive and short-term earnings management. The results collectively provide a new 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics 
 
Panel A. Distributions for the sample firms used for ERC1-2 tests (N=14,998) 
 Mean Std. Dev 25% Median 75% 
DA -0.048 1.439 -0.103 -0.009 0.068 
ERC1 0.052 0.746 -0.235 0.030 0.311 
ERC2 2.685 36.553 -9.962 1.191 14.812 
VESTED_EQ 1.560 3.136 0.086 0.543 1.675 
Normalized 
VESTED_EQ 
0.000 0.999 -0.453 -0.318 0.044 
SIZE 7.740 1.542 6.665 7.674 8.767 
MB 2.937 2.873 1.444 2.136 3.310 
LEV 0.226 0.196 0.067 0.183 0.346 
ROA 0.055 0.087 0.024 0.054 0.095 
SALES_GROWTH 0.084 0.226 -0.007 0.067 0.151 
FIRMAGE 41.910 16.004 27.000 43.000 56.000 
CAPEX 0.063 0.059 0.025 0.046 0.080 
TANGIBILITY 0.324 0.235 0.134 0.259 0.487 
R&D 0.039 0.162 0.000 0.000 0.032 
D_R&D 0.525 0.499 0.000 1.000 1.000 
 
 
Panel B. Distributions for the sample firms used for ERC3 test (N=11,301) 
 
 Mean Std. Dev 25% Median 75% 
DA -0.018 1.425 -0.095 -0.007 0.069 
ERC3 2.596 6.221 -0.336 1.770 5.041 
VESTED_EQ 1.493 2.970 0.071 0.517 1.602 
Normalized 
VESTED_EQ 
0.000 0.999 -0.445 -0.320 0.044 
SIZE 7.678 1.616 6.568 7.669 8.759 
MB 2.876 2.925 1.398 2.045 3.165 
LEV 0.246 0.202 0.082 0.204 0.376 
ROA 0.047 0.097 0.020 0.047 0.087 
SALES_GROWTH 0.092 0.257 -0.009 0.066 0.155 
FIRMAGE 42.550 16.625 26.000 44.000 59.000 
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CAPEX 0.063 0.061 0.025 0.046 0.079 
TANGIBILITY 0.347 0.248 0.139 0.282 0.552 
R&D 0.048 0.310 0.000 0.000 0.027 
D_R&D 0.535 0.499 0.000 1.000 1.000 
 
 
Panel C. Distributions for the sample firms used for ERC4 test (N=3,284) 
 
 Mean Std. Dev 25% Median 75% 
DA -0.072 1.158 -0.078 -0.007 0.044 
ERC4 0.283 2.089 -0.581 0.153 0.997 
VESTED_EQ 1.367 2.543 0.047 0.538 1.595 
Normalized 
VESTED_EQ 
0.000 0.997 -0.487 -0.321 0.082 
SIZE 8.206 1.482 7.129 8.117 9.169 
MB 3.181 2.977 1.603 2.294 3.459 
LEV 0.230 0.183 0.079 0.192 0.362 
ROA 0.071 0.060 0.034 0.061 0.101 
SALES_GROWTH 0.087 0.222 0.005 0.065 0.134 
FIRMAGE 49.987 12.945 41.000 52.000 63.000 
CAPEX 0.060 0.045 0.029 0.050 0.079 
TANGIBILITY 0.375 0.245 0.169 0.314 0.586 
R&D 0.017 0.034 0.000 0.000 0.018 







Table 2. Pearson Correlations 
 
DA ERC1 ERC2 ERC3 ERC4 
VESTED_ 
EQ 





CAPEX TANGIBILITY R&D 
D_ 
R&D 
DA 1.000                
ERC1 0.002 1.000               
ERC2 0.005 0.920 1.000              
ERC3 0.008 0.107 0.103 1.000             
ERC4 -0.025 -0.011 -0.011 0.067 1.000            
VESTED_ 
EQ 
-0.002 -0.004 -0.006 0.024 -0.081 1.000           
SIZE -0.000 -0.050 -0.038 -0.022 -0.072 0.184 1.000          
MB -0.023 -0.007 -0.001 -0.030 -0.042 0.218 0.185 1.000         
LEV 0.007 -0.004 -0.006 -0.078 -0.035 -0.162 -0.143 -0.284 1.000        
ROA 0.031 0.009 0.014 0.109 -0.007 0.127 0.344 -0.158 -0.018 1.000       
SALES_ 
GROWTH 0.008 -0.009 -0.005 -0.017 -0.007 0.126 0.064 0.142 -0.080 -0.014 1.000      
FIRM 
AGE 0.013 -0.014 -0.005 -0.082 -0.009 -0.087 0.394 -0.015 0.014 0.211 -0.090 1.000     
CAPEX 0.018 -0.011 -0.006 0.017 0.036 0.071 0.085 0.081 -0.065 0.068 0.187 0.006 1.000    
TANGIBILITY 0.032 0.000 0.003 -0.024 0.065 -0.067 0.101 -0.045 0.139 0.072 0.002 0.202 0.571 1.000   
R&D -0.009 -0.007 -0008 -0.078 0.009 0.017 -0.092 0.191 -0.151 -0.496 0.046 -0.109 -0.049 -0.092 1.000  
D_R&D 0.018 0.011 0.011 -0.007 -0.034 -0.054 -0.017 -0.203 0.360 0.163 -0.040 0.035 0.074 0.170 -0.259 1.000 




Table 3. The interaction effect of ERC and CEO exercisable equity compensation on earnings management 
 
Variable 
ERC1 ERC2 ERC3 ERC4 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 


































































































































































































































































Year fixed effects excluded included excluded included excluded included excluded included 
Industry fixed effects excluded included excluded included excluded included excluded included 
N 14,365 14,377 14,365 14,377 10,814 10,821 3,180 3,174 
Adjusted R2 0.52% 1.54% 0.51% 1.55% 0.64% 2.70% 1.14% 4.46% 











Table 4. The effect of exercisable equity compensation on earnings persistency 
 
Variable 
ERC1 ERC2 ERC3 













































:		LAG_ EPS × 
















































































































Table 5. The interaction effect of ERC and top executives’ exercisable equity compensation on earnings management 
 
Variable 
ERC1 ERC2 ERC3 ERC4 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 


































































































































































































































































Year fixed effects excluded included excluded included excluded included excluded included 
Industry fixed effects excluded included excluded included excluded included excluded included 
N 13,844 13,850 13,844 13,851 10,312 10,325 3,097 3,093 
Adjusted R2 0.61% 1.50% 0.56% 1.49% 0.67% 2.64% 1.09% 4.79% 








 경 자가 보상의 극 화를 해 스톡옵션 행사  주가를 높이기 해 재량  
발생액을 이용하여 이익을 증가시키는 이익 리를 하는지 검증하는 많은 선행연구가 
있다. 본 연구는 기존의 연구와 차별화하여 최고경 자의 주식 련 보상  
가득된(vested) 는 행사할 수 있는(exercisable) 부분 – 구체 으로, 가득된 제한부 
주식과 행사할 수 있는 스톡옵션 – 에 을 맞추어 논의를 개한다. Bebchuck and 
Fried (2010)의 연구에서는 즉시 행사할 수 있는 주식 련 보상을 보유하는 경 자의 
경우, 다양한 수단을 동원하여 주가에 향을 미치려는 기회주의  행동이 존재한다고 
다양한 사례를 통해 밝혔다. 선행연구와의  다른 차별 은 최고경 진의 주식보상 
인센티 와 단기  이익조정 유인간의 그릇된 상 계 가운데에 이익반응계수(ERC)을 
도입했다는 이다. 이익반응계수가 큰 기업에서, 경 자에게 주식보상 인센티 가 
주어진 경우, 경 자의 이익조정을 한 재량  발생액이 더 커짐을 실증하 다. 즉, 
이익반응계수가 큰 회사에 속한 최고경 자는 이익을 증가시키는 재량  발생권을 통해 
개인  부를 극 화할 수 있는데, 이는 이익반응계수가 클수록 회사의 주가가 이익 련 
정보에 더 크게 반응하기 때문이다. 나아가 실증결과, 경 자의 즉시 행사할 수 있는 
주식보상이 증가할수록 그 기업의 이익지속성이 감소되었고, 특히 이익반응계수가 큰 
기업일수록 이익지속성의 감소가 더욱 지배 임을 검증하 다. 본 연구는 이익-주가 
상 계를 도입하여 기존의 이익 리 연구에 새로운 을 제시하는데 기여한다.   
    
주요어 : 이익조정, 주식 련 보상, 이익반응계수(ERC), 이익지속성 
학  번 : 2013-20540 
 
